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1. Introduction 
In many circles China is increasingly seen as a threat or even menace to the global 
economic system. The source of this peril is China’s very success in liberalizing its 
economy, achieving stupendous rates of  GDP growth and becoming a very dynamic 
exporter of ever increasing range of goods to ever increasing number of markets. The 
criticism originated in the United States; the recent build-up of  its  trade deficit  has been 
linked  with an extremely rapid  Chinese export expansion to the United States 
unaccompanied by a matching growth of imports from that region. A purely economic 
issue, or non-issue as we shall argue, has become a real political problem.  
 
American politicians speak with rising frequency and force about the need to solve the 
U.S.–China trade deficit problem. The Economist reported on May 19
th, 2007 in an 
article entitled  “America’s fear of China”: 
“The itch to get tough with Beijing is urgent in Congress. Brandishing China's growing 
bilateral trade surplus as proof, congressmen from both parties have denounced the 
country as a currency manipulator, an illegal export-subsidiser, a violator of rights to 
intellectual property and all-round trade scoff-law. China-bashers have introduced a 
dozen bills in the new Congress. Some are bound to languish, but others may be passed—
though there would then be further hurdles to jump, not least the president's power of 
veto (George Bush has other conflicts on his mind). The most threatening include 
proposals that would declare China's cheap currency an illegal subsidy and allow 
American firms to seek compensatory tariffs” 
 
Just four days later The Wall Street Journal commented on a risk of U.S. – China trade 
conflict
1: 
“Is there another international conflict on America's horizon? Tension is steadily 
mounting between the United States and China over trade issues. The U.S. trade deficit 
with China accounted for almost one-third the record $765 billion U.S. trade deficit in 
2006. Both sides agree that this large imbalance is unsustainable, but negotiations to 
reduce it are making little progress -- putting pressure on the negotiators in Washington 
at this week's Strategic Economic Dialogue meetings. If not managed properly, the trade 
imbalance could escalate into a trade war.” 
 
                                                 
1Quoted from  http:www.trouthabouttrade.org 
  2European countries are beginning to follow the U.S. lead. The New York Times reported 
on April 29, 2006: 
“A few years ago, as the United States discovered that its trade deficit with China was 
growing rapidly, there was more than a little smugness in Europe. Its deficit with China 
was very small, a sign that its residents were not like the profligate Americans who 
insisted on spending money they did not have on Chinese imports. 
…… the euro zone's trade deficit with China, measured as a percentage of G.D.P., is 
growing at almost exactly the same rate the American deficit was growing five years ago. 
The difference may have been in timing, not in magnitude.” 
 
Not surprisingly, the language of European politicians has become quite similar to that of 
their North American colleagues. In fact, the European Union is taking concrete steps to 
slow down China’s exports. Thus, the European Commission decided recently to impose 
a 19.4% tariff on imports of  leather Chinese shoes.
2 Of course,  the official explanation  
for this action is based on "disguised subsidies"  allegedly received by Chinese shoe 




Bilateral trade deficits can clearly cause concerns among policy makers and prompt them 
to take corrective measures. And yet the economic profession  would  be probably 
unanimous in agreeing that bilateral trade deficits, or surpluses for that matter, should be 
of no concern at all. There seems to be a disconnect on this issue, not for the first time, 
between the economic profession on the one hand and the policy makers and public 
opinion on the other hand. The latter fail,  or don’t wish to see, the wisdom and benefits 
stemming from trade. If the principle of balanced bilateral trade  should have a general 
validity, then every country would have to balance its trade with every trading partner. It 
goes without saying, that overall trade surpluses and deficit could never  materialize if the 
logic of balanced bilateral trade was fully applied. Under these conditions, benefits from 
intertemporal trade could not be obtained.    
 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to note that a large part of the European exports to China takes the form of machinery needed to 
produce shoes, clothing and other products where European producers used to be competitive. 
3 This charge might be true but in no way should it connected with the EU trade deficit with  China.  
  3Recent macroeconomic debates about current account imbalances of the United States, 
Japan, China, Germany and the oil exporting countries show that macro-level trade 
disequilibrium can also be seen as a problem. With regard to overall trade imbalances, 
there is less of agreement among the economists, especially in reference to the size of   
trade deficits. Max Corden (2006)  has expressed  the view of the majority that trade  
deficits and  surpluses can be perfectly rational phenomena expressing saving   
propensities of different countries, their actual and potential  GDP, their level of 
competitiveness at present  and in  future, and even demographic conditions. Current 
account deficits and surpluses reflect intertemporal trade. Currently produced goods and 
services can be exchanged for financial claims. Surely, there must be   room for this type 
of transactions in the world of different endowments, varying preferences, diverse growth 
prospects and dissimilar saving/spending trajectories followed by various countries. In 
principle, this type of trade should generate benefits to the participating countries.  It is 
perhaps better understood that at the micro level an individual is not expected to spend 
exactly what he earns year in and year out.  
 
The most far-reaching conclusion of Corden’s analysis is that in the age of globalization 
the opportunities for intertemporal trade should only increase. Thus, current account 
surpluses and deficits may well increase rather than subside in the future. It should 
signify the fact that globalization is working, not that it is failing. 
 
This paper, honoring Professor Max  Corden, will show that in the age of globalization 
bilateral trade surpluses can be expected to grow as well.  A new type of trade, based on 
fragmentation of production and international outsourcing, has emerged in recent 
decades. A finer division of labor is being established as national borders become 
increasingly porous with regard to organization of the production process and the 
Internet, modern international banking and more and more efficient transportation shrink 
the distance between countries. 
 
The principle contribution of this paper, however, is to demonstrate on the basis of  U.S. 
– China trade that  the available information about  bilateral trade  imbalances is highly 
  4distorted. International trade statistics had been designed for the world in which trade 
takes place in the form of  final goods. Today, we live in an era when parts and 
components, rather than final goods,  are  exchanged frequently  even over long distances 
and when trade in intermediate products is more important that trade in finished products. 
In this new world the expression “Made in X” should really be replaced by a more 
appropriate term “Made in X, Y and Z”.  Or better still, it should disappear altogether.  
 
There are serious implications of the described paradigm change: International trade 
flows should be measured on the basis of value-added in various participating countries. 
Here again, a connection of Max Corden’s previous work is apparent. In the theory of 
effective protection the concept of value added plays the central role.
4
 
2. Fragmentation of Production and Outsourcing 
The theory fragmentation of production was put forward by Ronald W. Jones and Henryk 
Kierzkowski in a festschrift volume honoring Robert Baldwin (1990). The essential 
elements of the framework can be readily stated: 
 
An alternative way of generating output is to divide the production process  into two or 
more production blocs. Again, constant returns to scale are assumed at the level of 
individual segments. Production stages do not function independently, they are arranged 
in patterns determined  to a large extent by engineers and existing technologies.  An 
important feature of the fragmented technology is that services are called in to “connect” 
individual blocks. These services range from transportation, quality control, R&D and 
insurance to telecommunications and various activities related to the Internet. It seems 
reasonable to assume  that service links require inputs of various factors in quantities that 
are independent of the scale of output of a final good.
5  
 
                                                 
4 The classic references are  Corden  (1966) and (1971). 
5 For  some empirical and theoretical support  for this assumption  see Jones and  Kierzkowski (2005 a,b) 
  5The combination of constant returns to scale in production of individual blocks and 
increasing returns to scale is service links may lead to fragmentation and outsourcing.
6
Fragmentation allows producers to lower the marginal cost of the final good.
7  Cost 
savings achieved this way must be compared with  fixed cost of service links. With  a 
suitably large scale of output, fragmentation dominates integrated technology. And the 
cost minimizing degree of fragmentation  increases as the scale of production expands. 
As famously stated by Adam Smith, the size of the market determines the extent of the 




Fragmentation and outsourcing are not purely international phenomena.  They can occur 
within a domestic economy. Indeed, a better knowledge of cost-reducing opportunities, 
lower costs of service links and a better protection of the local legal system tend to  spur 
domestic fragmentation and outsourcing first. However, international deregulation of 
service industries, unification of international legal systems, liberalization of trade in 
services, technological progress in the tertiary sector, and increased awareness of 
production capabilities around the world, all lead to international fragmentation and 
outsourcing. 
 
International differences in production costs at the level of  individual  blocks may have 
different origins.
9  The Ricardian model can be most helpful in explaining the 
phenomenon of outsourcing. However, the Heckscher-Ohlin model can just as well shed 
some light on this problem. It should be also pointed out that fragmentation and 
                                                 
6 This implication stand in sharp contrast with one of the key result of the new geography and trade theory  according to 
which an increase in the market size leads to agglomeration. This issue is discussed in depth in Jones and Kierzkowski 
(2005 a, b). 
7 Note that under assumed fixed costs of service links, lower marginal production costs of  production blocs are a 
necessary condition  for fragmentation to became viable method of production. 
8 Jones, Kierzkowski and  Chen (2005) test the propositions that the size of output has a positive impact on 
fragmentation, outsourcing and, consequently, on the size of trade in parts and components. There is also empirical 
support for the thesis that  lowering of the service links costs works in the same direction. Golub, Jones and 
Kierzkowski (2007) also find evidences that service links encourage trade in general and trade in parts and components 
(as well as  flows of international direct investments) 
9 The idea of heterogeneous firms is becoming more and more accepted. 







Figure 1.  Integrated Production 
 
 






Figure 2. Fragmented Production 
Japan 
Service link 
China   inputs 
U.S.A. 
 
                                                 
10 Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001) contains some evidence on this point with regard to East Asia. 
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The basic insight of the fragmentation theory is shown in Figure 1. In order to set the 
stage for the next section of the paper we use a hypothetical example of an industry 
which is initially located in Japan and its output is directed to the United  States. The 
process of production is fully integrated. Suppose now that the Japanese producers find 
out that production can be divided into blocks and that the initial stage of production can 
be beneficially relocated to China leading to a reduction in the marginal cost. Exactly the 
same final product will be produced but cheaper. Of course, there will now be a need to 
establish a service link between producers of components in Japan and  China.  Figure 2 
captures this simple example of fragmentation and outsourcing. It also show a more 
complex  production arrangement with South Korea and the United  States joining the 
production network. Although service links become more intense and costly, the higher 
degree of fragmentation may dominate integrated technology and   two-block production 
set-up.  
 
What are trade balance implications of fragmentation?  Even the simple partial 
equilibrium analysis presented in Figure 1 and 2 shows that there can be an impact on   
imports undertaken by the United States and, especially, on bilateral trade. Since 
fragmentation and outsourcing help to bring production costs down, one should expect 
that, ceteris paribus, the  U.S. would import a greater quantity  of the good in  question.   
 
  8The important aspect of outsourcing is that Japan may disappear from the U.S. statistical 
radar screen, completely replaced by China. The more complex production arrangement 
depicted in Figure 2 suggest that what passes  as Chinese exports to the United States 
hides exports of  parts and components by Japan, Korea and  indeed the United States 
itself. As Winston Churchill once said,  statistics are not always reliable. (Actually, it was 
said much more bluntly.) 
 
The statistical distortion resulting from outsourcing works in the opposite direction as 
well. The U.S. exports to China are likely to contain imports of parts and components 
from various countries, possibly including China itself. 
 
It goes without saying that  distorted values of exports and imports lead to  a falsification 
of the current account balance. And the degree of the misrepresentation is likely to 
increase with globalization as more complex production networks are created with an 
ever increasing number of interacting countries. Also the range of industries practicing 
international fragmentation of production seems to increase with globalization. 
 
Once again, the proper trade statistics should be based on the domestic value-added 
content at different stages of production. This would require a major overhaul of 
international system of collecting trade data.  
 
The distortive effects of fragmentation  have already been made remarked by several 
authors with reference to rules of origin and  the imposition of tariffs 
11.  Peter Lloyd 
(2001) points out that applying rules of origin is a straightforward matter only in an 
unrealistic world where all production processes  were completely integrated. He calls for 
a replacement of present tariffs by a system based on value added. 
 
Other authors have begun to draw implications of international outsourcing for trade 
flows and the way we measure them. J. P. Voon and Y. Y. Kueh (2000) focused on the  
                                                 
11 Of course, Max Corden’s entire work on effective protection deals with the world of fragmentation, outsourcing and 
international production networks without ever using those terms! 
  9Hong Kong – China connection and point out that:  “Owing to the SCO
12 rules, goods 
initially dispatched from Hong Kong  to China for “outward processing” (OP) or 
assembling, and then either directly or indirectly exported from China to the United 
States (US) have been consistently counted by the United Sates entirely as imports from 
China rather than Hong Kong”.
13  Professor Lawrence J. Lau (2003)  also argues that  
global outsourcing and division of labor have falsified the true Chinese surplus vis-à-vis 
the United States.   
 
3. An Empirical Study 
This section attempts to measure the impact of  outsourcing on China – U.S. trade flows 
and, consequently, trade balance between the two countries.  
 
In order to proceed with empirical work a  statistical equivalent of  “a production block” 
has to be identified. Fortunately,  trade in parts and components can now be extracted 
from the UN COMTRADE database.   Bilateral trade flows of  final products used in this 
paper come from the same source. All GDP series have been obtained from World Bank 
WDI database.   
 
Let’s  start with U.S. imports from  China. Our discussion of  theoretical foundations of 
fragmentation suggested that the phenomenon  can occur within any of the well-
established trade models. We have decided to use a simple gravity-styled equation, U.S.  
and China’s GDPs being the main explanatory variables
14 . However, this simple 
approach  has been extended to  capture the role played  by flows of parts and 
components resulting from outsourcing.  
 
Awe postulate that  the bilateral China – U.S. trade is affected by  imports  of parts and 
components  by these two countries from a number of third courtiers. The U.S. imports 
from China equation is specified as follows: 
 
                                                 
12 Single Country of Origin. 
13  Cited from. Voon, . J. P and Y. Y. Kueh,  (2000) p. 124. 
14 In another study of fragmentation and outsourcing a good use is made of the Ricardian model. See Golub., Jones, and 
Kierzkowski  (2007). 







where  ImportsUSA, China,t denotes the U.S aggregate imports from China in year t, 
GDPUSA,t and GDPChina,t denote the annual U.S GDP and the annual China’s GDP 
respectively, PCChina,i,t denotes China’s annual imports of parts and components from 
country  i in year t.
15  Please note that the imports of parts and components, from 
whatever direction, are augmented by 1.0. This is a useful feature of our extended gravity 
model which will readily allow us to calculate trade flows without outsourcing. 
 
Transforming the above model into a linear equation yields: 
 
(2 )  Log(ImportsUSA,China,t)= α·log(GDPUSA,t)+
 β·log(GDPChina,t) 
                                      + γ1·log(1+PCChina,1,t)+ γ2·log(1+PCChina,2,t)+...+ γi·log(1+PCChina,i,t) 
   
China imports parts and  components from, literally, dozens of countries. A priori there is 
no way of telling which of these imports, and to what extent, will end up disguised as 
exports to the United States and which will be re-exported somewhere else. It could 
happen that some of  imported parts and components will not be re-exported at all but 
rather used domestically as consumption or investment goods. They would need some 
local transformation and processing, just like the final goods that will be exported.  The 
degree of transformation of imported parts and components may vary depending whether 
the final destination of a good will be the domestic market or export . 
 
China imports parts and components primarily from Japan, China Hong Kong SAR, the 
U.S., EU15, Republic of  Korea, and ASEAN.  Having tried various combinations of 
explanatory variables, we found out that equation (3) performed best.   
   
(3) Log(ImportsUSA,China,t)= α·log(GDPUSA,t)+ γ1·log(1+PCChina,Japan,t)+ γ2·log(1+PCChina,HongKong,t)
 
                                      + γ3·log(1+PCChina,USA,t)+ γ4·log(1+PCChina,Korea,t) 
 
The OLS estimators are displayed in the first column of Table 1.
16   
 
Table 1. Regressions of  U.S. total imports from China 
                                                 
15 When there is no imports on parts and components from country i, we will get value 1 in the equation, which means 
there is no impact from this country. 
16 Based on Ramsey RESET, we conclude that the model has no omitted variables.  
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Before interpreting the coefficients of the estimators, we have to face the non-stationary 
issue brought about by running regressions on time series variables.  We find that the  
time series have unit roots and therefore conclude that the trends of the variables are 
stochastic.   
 
In our empirical work reported here we do not try to generate stationary time series via 
differentiation of the variables.  However, we test for possible co-integration.  Following 
the Engle-Granger test, we get a τ value of -5.61, which is in absolute terms  larger than 
the 1% critical value computed by Davidson and  MacKinnon (1993)
17. Therefore we 
treat the variables as co-integrated time series and  run the regression.  The long-run 
correlation  is reflected by the estimators listed in Table 1. We also apply the error 
correction mechanism (ECM) to  show the short term dynamics.
 18  The coefficient of the 
                                                 
17   1 
2
ˆ 1.46
        t = (-5.61)
       R  0.72
tt uu − Δ= − ⋅
=
18
 ECM estimation:   R
2=0.95 
 Coefficients  Standard  Error 
log( ) USA GDP Δ 3.21 0.56   
,, log(1 ) China Japan t PC Δ+ 0.20 0.06   
,, log(1 ) China HongKong t PC Δ+ 0.33 0.06   
  12error correction term is negative and highly significant.  Loosely speaking, China’s 
imports of parts and components affect its exports to the U.S. in both the short run and 
the long run. 
 
 
It is striking that, on the basis  of our results, China’s GDP does not seem to have any 
significant effect on its total exports to the United State. One would expect a rather 
different result. It can be readily imagined that China’s rapid economic growth favors 
export-oriented industries. Indeed, the creation of the special export zones   back in the 
late 1970s and through 1980s was said to serve this purpose.  And yet, the flow of   
exports to the U.S. are driven by the demand factor represented by the U.S. GDP 
 
The positive values of  coefficients γ1 and  γ2 support our presumption  that China’s 
imports of parts and components from Japan and Hong Kong serve as intermediate goods 
to be enriched with Chinese labor, capital and other factors of production and send on the 
market of the United States.    An  increase in China’s imports on parts and components 
from Japan by one percent will  increase  U.S. aggregate imports from China by about 
quarter of one percent.. The elasticity of total U.S. imports from China is even larger in 
the case of  Japan-China  flows of parts and components 
  
The  results presented in Table 1 suggest a   negative relationship between China’s 
imports of parts and component from the U.S. and South Korea and China’s aggregate 
exports to the United States.  In order to explain this finding one may wish to think of a 
multitude of foreign markets where Chinese exports of final goods can be placed. With 
exports capabilities fully utilized, simultaneous expansion in all the markets for final 
goods may not be possible. Thus, imports of parts and components from the U.S. and 
South Korea could be undertaken to export final goods to, say, the European Union.  
                                                                                                                                                 
,, log(1 ) China USA t PC Δ+
,, log(1 ) China Korea t PC Δ+
-0.34 0.06   
-0.22 0.05   
Error Correction Coefficient  -1.47  0.38 
 
  13Trade diversion  could take place as some  Chinese factors of  production have to be 
moved from “the U.S. desk” to “the E.U. desk”. 
 
An alternative scenario could be advanced in which  U.S. multinationals change to a 
more complex system of global production and distribution. Instead of importing a final 
good from China to the United States market (possibly for further distribution throughout 
the world) they switch to outsourcing, supply Chinese sub-contractors with some 
components and ship the final good directly from China to various foreign destinations. 
 
Given the fact that coefficients γ1 and γ2   are positive while coefficients γ3 and γ4   are 
negative,  is it possible that the combined effect of outsourcing reduces the total flow of 
goods from  China to the U.S.? It will be shown shortly that in aggregate China’s imports 
on parts and components do have a significantly positive impact on its exports to the 
U.S.. 
 
  In column (2) and column (3) of Table 1 the basic equation is re-estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) and General Lease Squares (GLS) respectively.  The results 
are very close to those based on OLS. 
 
Turning to the question of an overall impact of outsourcing on trade flows, the following 
exercise is proposed: Set Chinese  imports of parts and components equal to zero and 
calculate the implied value of  U.S. total imports from  China. Table 2 shows what  U.S. 
imports from China would be like under “no-fragmentation”.  
 
Table 2. Estimated U.S. imports from China assuming China’s imports of parts and 
components are equal to zero  
Year  
U.S. aggregate 
imports from China  
 
(billion US dollars) 
Estimated imports 
from China 
assuming  no 
Chinese imports of 
parts and 
components  
(billion US dollars) 
 U.S. imports from 
China related to 
Chinese imports of 
parts and 
components 
(billion US dollars) 
The share of U.S. 
imports from China 
related to China’s 
imports of parts 
and components 
1990 16.3  8.6  7.7 47.4% 
  141991 20.3  9.5  10.8 53.2% 
1992 27.5  11.4  16.1 58.6% 
1993 33.7  13.3  20.3 60.4% 
1994 41.4  16.2  25.1 60.8% 
1995 48.5  18.8  29.8 61.3% 
1996 54.4  22.4  32.0 58.7% 
1997 65.8  27.3  38.5 58.5% 
1998 75.1  32.4  42.7 56.9% 
1999 87.8  39.1  48.7 55.5% 
2000 107.6  47.1  60.5 56.2% 
2001 109.4  51.7  57.7 52.7% 
2002 133.5  58.3  75.2 56.3% 
2003 163.3  68.2  95.1 58.2% 
 
Table 2 shows a spectacular growth  of the United State’s imports from China. However, 
already in 1990 as much as  47.4% of those imports were parts and components that 
China had imported herself.     The share of foreign parts and components in China’s 
exports to the U.S has risen to 58.2% by 2003. Clearly, China and the United States know 
a thing or two about fragmentation and outsourcing. 
 
One of the predictions put forward in Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) was that 
international fragmentation of production creates a unique opportunity for developing 
countries and new players
19 in the global economy to reach the markets of developed 
countries  through the back doors, so to speak. When Nike, Toys “R” Us or Walmart 
placed China in their global production networks these actions opened Chinese producers 
access  to markets that are not quite competitive. Huge advertising and  R&D expenses 
would have to be incurred by  newcomers  wishing to establish presence in markets for 
sports footwear, toys, clothing or electronics. China has recognized and took advantage 
of  a unique opportunity of integrating itself into the global economy. Outsourcing to 
China must have been also beneficial to American producers or otherwise they would not 
have been doing it. 
 
Let’s turn to U.S. exports to China and how they are influenced by  U.S. imports of parts 
and components from its main trading partners. Table 3 contains the regression results. 
                                                 
19  At the time of writing the article we had no clue that the new players would also include countries of Eastern Europe 
and former republics of the  Soviet Union. Indeed, some of those countries have perused the option with great success. 
  15GDPs of  both countries appear now relevant suggesting that demand and supply factors 
are in operation. Imports of parts and components from China, Japan and South Korea 
lead to expansion of  American exports to the most populous country in the world.  It is 
worth pointing out that Japan  is the biggest exporter of parts and components in the 
world and it affects Sino-U.S. trade in both directions. 
 
 The data suggest  that a trade diversion effect operates in case of Canada. Again, one can 
imagine an integrated production process under which a good is produced in the United 
States and partly or wholly exported to China. Suppose now that the original producer 
switches to a fragmented production process, imports some parts from Canada, takes it 
through another production stage, and sends it back to Canada  for final finishing, 
packaging, and export to various markets, including Chinese.
20   
 
Table 4 contains the value of  implied U.S. exports to China without outsourcing. Those 
exports would be 18.4% smaller in 1990 then the actual figures and 27.5% smaller in 
2003. Fragmentation is a global process. One would expect that most market economies 
would respond to new opportunities and rearrange their production patterns. And, it is of 
course a two-way street. It means that if China is practicing outsourcing, the United 
States and/or some other countries engage in it as well. 
 
Going beyond the information contained in Tables 2 and 4, it could be speculated that 
developing countries could in general  get a boost to their exports through fragmentation 
and outsourcing. This is a very good news for the Third World. The dominant trade 
paradigm in the XIX century placed the South in the center of international commerce. 
This role  was marginalizes in the second part of the XX century when North-North flows 
became dominant through an expansion of intra-industry trade between developed 
countries. The new XXI century trade paradigm is based on a finer division of labor and 
offers a chance to developing countries to get into the game in a big way. Table 2  and 4 
show that this is indeed happening. However, China’s experience can not be 
                                                 
20 This line of reasoning suggest that a multi-country framework should be used to evaluate the impact of fragmentation 
on bilateral trade flows. 
  16automatically replicated by other developing countries. As stressed  and documented in 
Golub, Jones and Kierzkowski (2007) national service links constitute entry membership fees  to 
the XXI century global trading club. 
 
As stressed in the introduction to this paper, international fragmentation of production 
leads to misrepresentation of  bilateral trade deficits. Without importing parts and 
components, the U.S. aggregate exports to China would decrease by about 20% to 30%. 
Similarly, Chinese exports to the U.S. would shrink by about 50 – 60% with no 
outsourcing. The “no-outsourcing” scenario alters the trade balance picture in a major 
way as shown in Figure 3. U.S. – China trade deficit is shown based on the UN 
COMTRADE data as well as using U.S. government statistics.  Roughly about two thirds 
of the deficit would disappear in 2003 in the absence of imports of parts and components 
by both countries. Would this make the United States better off? Clearly not, although the 
negative press publicity would likely subside. 
  
Table 3. Regressions of the U.S. exports to China 
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Table 4.  Estimated U.S. exports to China assuming no imports of parts and components  
  
Year  
 U.S. aggregate 
exports to China  
 
(billion US dollars) 
Estimated exports  
to China assuming  
no U.S. imports of 
parts and 
components  
 U.S. exports to 
China related to 
the U.S. import of 
parts and 
components 
The share of  U.S. 
exports to China 
related to the U.S. 
import of parts and 
components 
  17(billion US dollars)  (billion US dollars) 
1990  6.6 5.4 1.2  18.4% 
1991  8.0 5.8 2.2  27.9% 
1992  8.9 6.5 2.4  26.5% 
1993  10.7 7.1  3.6  33.3% 
1994  13.9 8.6  5.3  38.3% 
1995  16.1 10.2  6.0 37.0% 
1996  16.2 11.8  4.4 27.3% 
1997  16.3 13.4  2.9 17.9% 
1998  16.9 14.8  2.1 12.4% 
1999  19.5 16.5  3.0 15.6% 
2000  22.4 18.6  3.8 16.9% 
2001  26.2 20.1  6.1 23.4% 
2002  27.3 21.9  5.4 19.6% 
2003  33.9 24.6  9.3 27.5% 
 
  18  
 
Figure 3. U.S. trade balance with China assuming no trade flows of parts and components 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
The estimated U.S.trade deficit with to China
The U.S.trade deficit with China reported by the U.S.government




The exercise reported in Figure 3 may be useful but it should be supplemented by another 
question: Given that outsourcing is a  fact of life, how big is the U.S. trade deficit based 
on value added in China and the United States? In order to answer this question one 
requires some information about the extent of processing undergone by imported 
intermediate goods in both countries. Lau (2003) suggests that “….the domestic value-
added content of Chinese exports to the U.S. is low – it may be estimated at 20%.” On 
the other hand, the U.S. domestic  value-added of  U.S. exports to China easily surpasses 
this figure, it is assumed by Lawrence Lau to be about 60%. 
 
Applying these numbers to 2003  trade figures would suggest that  exports of China to the 
United States amounted to $ 87.2 billion in domestic value-added terms while “purified” 
trade flows in the opposite direction   reached  $30.2 billion. 
  19The U.S. – China “true” trade deficit in that year equaled  $57.0 billion, about half of  
what is reported. It is a simple matter to redo the calculations for the entire period under 
the  analysis. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Fragmentation of production  has taken international trade into a new realm.  The 
decisions how much to produce and for which markets have to be combined with 
decisions where to produce and with what degree of intra-product specialization. 
 
In this new world the concept of domestic value-added re-emerges as being appropriate 
for calculating international trade flows and trade deficits. The designation “made in…” 
should disappear as statistical reporting systems catch-up with the new world. 
 
The above considerations have been applied to Sino – U.S. trade and the hotly debated  
trade deficit between the two countries. Taking into account imports of parts and 
components by both courtiers  reduces this deficit  by about half. It would be worthwhile 
to repeat the analysis of this papers for other countries and trading blocs  - Japan and the 
European Union are natural candidates. 
 
The main idea advanced in this paper has a wider application. In fact, it has long been 
recognized in domestic taxation and statistical reporting.  There is no reason why we 
should stop at national borders as they become less  well-defined and relevant. 
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